This paper evaluates the extent to which a DSGE model can account for the impact of tax policy shocks.
Introduction
This paper studies the aggregate dynamic macroeconomic effects of tax liability changes. Studying post World War II US time series, we find that implemented tax cuts provide a major stimulus to the economy. Pre-announced tax cuts instead lead to declines in economic activity prior to implementation while providing a stimulus similar to that of unanticipated tax cuts when implemented. We confront a DSGE model with this empirical evidence and demonstrate how it can account for the key features of the estimated effects of tax changes. These findings are important because they indicate that DSGE models are meaningful for the evaluation of the dynamic adjustment to tax policy interventions.
The empirical analysis builds on Mertens and Ravn (2009) . The measurement of tax shocks is based on Romer and Romer's (2008a) narrative account of federal US tax liability changes for the postwar period. We study the impact of those changes in tax liabilities that Romer and Romer (2008a) classify as exogenous and we introduce a timing convention that facilitates a distinction between anticipated and unanticipated tax changes. To be precise, our timing convention is based on the observed implementation lag, the difference between the date at which the tax liability change was implemented and the date that it became law. When this implementation lag exceeds (is shorter than) 90 days, we define the tax change as anticipated (unanticipated).
The anticipated and unanticipated tax shocks are embedded in vector autoregressions (VARs) in order to derive estimates of the dynamic effects of tax policy shocks. We find that unanticipated tax cuts give rise to significant increases in output, consumption, and investment, and a gradual increase in hours worked. Assuming that anticipated tax shocks are announced 6 quarters before their implementation, the median anticipation horizon in the data, we find that an anticipated tax cut is associated with a pre-implementation drop in output, investment and hours worked, while consumption remains roughly constant during the pre-implementation period. Once the tax change is implemented, we find that its impact is very similar to the effects of an unanticipated tax change. Thus, we find significant responses to tax news.
We then construct a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model in which anticipated and unanticipated variations in distortionary capital and labor income tax rates give rise to changes in tax liabilities. The key features of the benchmark model are consumer durables, habit formation, variable capacity utilization, and investment adjustment costs. Key structural parameters are estimated by indirect inference.
We find that the DSGE model can account for the shapes and sizes of the estimates of the response of the observables to changes in taxes. Interestingly, tax news effects can be accounted for in a model with standard preferences. This is an important finding because the literature on technology news shocks, c.f. Beaudry and Portier (2004 , 2006 , 2007 and Jaimovich and Rebelo (2006) , has shown that wealth effects on labor supply must be weak in order to generate an anticipation expansion of the economy in response to current good news about future productivity. This literature, however, provides no direct empirical evidence on such news effects in the data. Our estimation results imply that good news about future taxes leads to a pre-implementation decline in aggregate activity and this effect is consistent with standard preference models. On the other hand, in accordance with the technology news literature, we find that adjustment costs and variable capacity utilization are pertinent to understand the impact of tax shocks, as also stressed by Auerbach (1989) .
Another important insight relates to the anticipation effects on consumption of nondurable goods and services.
Our empirical results from the U.S. data agree with earlier studies of the consumption response to anticipated tax changes. Poterba (1988) tests whether aggregate U.S. consumption reacts to announcements of future tax changes and fails to find robust evidence in favor of this hypothesis. 1 Parker (1999) and Souleles (1999 Souleles ( , 2002 study Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) data and show that consumption responds to the implementation of tax changes rather than to their announcements. 2 Similarly, Heim (2007) studies announcements effects of state tax rebates on household consumption using CEX data and also finds no response of consumption to tax announcements. These results are often interpreted as evidence in favor of the presence of binding liquidity constraints or against forward looking behavior. For this reason we introduce into the model rule-of-thumb consumers next to intertemporally maximizing agents and find that their estimated share in total consumption is a relatively modest 14.6 percent. We find a low estimate of the share of rule-of-thumb agents because, when the share of rule-of-thumb consumers is large, the model cannot account for the impact of tax news on aggregate investment and hours worked.
Our results contribute to the existing literature on the macroeconomic effects of tax changes, such as Baxter and King (1993) , Braun (1994) and McGrattan (1994) , and tax foresight, such as Yang (2005) and House and Shapiro (2006, 2008) . Yang (2005) builds a simple DSGE model and shows that in response to an anticipated cut in the labor tax rate, consumption rises during the pre-implementation period while output, investment and hours worked contract; in response to an anticipated cut in the capital income tax rate instead, the opposite pattern is implied. We demonstrate that, in an economy with a more rigorous modeling of production and preference structures and with reasonable adjustment costs, the anticipation effects of capital income and labor income tax changes can be quite similar. We conduct a Hicksian decomposition of hours worked and consumption responses to changes in taxes into wealth effects and substitution effects that derive from changes in wages and interest rates. The responses of consumption and hours worked are dominated by substitution effects, while the wealth effects are very small. The key to understanding the sluggish hours response to surprise changes in taxes are the opposing substitution effects due to wages and interest rates.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The next section describes our estimation approach and discusses the dynamic effects of tax shocks. Section 3 contains the description of the DSGE model. The estimation of the structural parameters is contained in Section 4 . In Section 5 we discuss and analyze the results and Section 6 provides some extensions and robustness exercises. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
Reduced Form Evidence on the Effects of Tax Shocks
In this section we present VAR evidence on the impact of anticipated and unanticipated tax shocks. The methodology is based on Mertens and Ravn (2009) , but the results presented here are obtained from a larger dimensional VAR. We refer the reader to that paper for a more detailed analysis of the data as well as extensive robustness analysis.
.1 Empirical Specification and Identification
We identify tax shocks using Romer and Romer's (2008a) narrative account of historical US legislated federal tax liability changes. Based on analyses of official government documents, presidential speeches, and Congressional documents, these authors identify 51 legislated federal tax acts in the period 1947-2006 and a total of 110 separate changes in tax liabilities. We focus on the tax liability changes that Romer and Romer (2008a) classify as exogenous and are motivated either by long run growth objectives or by concerns about inherited debt. This results in a time series of 70 tax liability changes in total.
We use a timing convention to distinguish between anticipated and unanticipated tax changes. For each tax liability change we define its announcement date as the date at which the tax legislation became law (when it was signed by the President), and its implementation date at which, according to the legislation, the tax liability changes were to be introduced. We define anticipated tax liability changes as those for which the difference between these two dates, the implementation lag, exceeds 90 days. The results are robust to moderate changes in the size of this window because the distribution of the implementation lag is twin peaked, as discussed in Mertens and Ravn (2009) . This definition implies that 36 of the tax liability changes are anticipated while 34 are defined as surprise tax shocks. The median implementation lag in the data is 6 quarters.
We estimate the impact of the tax shocks from the following regression model, which we later show can be viewed as a finite sample approximation to the representation of the observables in the DSGE model:
where X t is a vector of endogenous variables, A and B control for a constant term and a linear trend, C (L) is a P-order lag polynomial, and D (L) and F (L) are (R + 1)-order lag polynomials. τ u t denotes unanticipated tax shocks which we measure as the dollar changes in tax liabilities as a percentage of current price GDP at the implementation date. τ a t,i are the pre-announced tax changes which are known at date t and which are to be im- In order to measure these we assume that pre-announced tax shocks enter agents' information sets at the earliest M quarters before their implementation. We set M equal to 16, i.e. 4 years. the logarithm of US GDP per adult in constant (chained) prices, c t is the logarithm of the real private sector consumption expenditure on nondurables and services per capita, d t is the logarithm of private sector consumption expenditure on durables per capita, i t is the logarithm of real aggregate gross investment per capita. h t is the logarithm of average hours worked per adult. Precise definitions and data sources are given in Table 1. A key assumption is that the Romer and Romer tax liability changes that we examine can be treated as observable exogenous shocks. The fact that the tax shocks are treated as observable allows us to derive the representation of the observables in (1) controlling directly for moving average terms in the implemented tax shocks through the polynomials D (L) and F (L). As we will show later, this also allows us to obtain precise estimates of the impulse responses for low orders of C (L). However, this does mean that exogeneity of the tax shocks is crucial. Recall from above that we eliminate all tax changes that Romer and Romer (2008a) categorize as endogenous. However, one may still question the extent to which Romer and Romer's (2008a) classification scheme leads to truly exogenous tax innovations. In Mertens and Ravn (2009) we test formally whether past values of observables have predictive power for the tax liability changes and conclude there is no strong evidence of predictability. 4 This does not exclude the possibility that tax liability changes are simply contemporaneous responses to variations in X t . It is extremely difficult to tell this hypothesis apart from our hypothesis that tax changes affect X t contemporaneously. In practice, we believe that legislative lags make it very likely that contemporaneous causality runs from changes in tax legislation to observables and not vice versa.
.Empirical Results
We set K = 6, which corresponds to the median implementation lag in the data that we study, R = 12, and P = 1 (the results are robust to assuming longer lag structures). We report the impulse response functions to a one percent decrease in the tax liabilities (relative to GDP) along with 68 percent non-parametric non-centered bootstrapped confidence intervals computed from 10,000 replications. The impulse response functions are shown for a forecast horizon of 24 quarters for unanticipated tax liability shocks, and for 6 quarters before its implementation to 24 quarters after the implementation in the case of anticipated shocks.
Column (a) of Figure 1 shows the impact of an unanticipated tax liability cut. The decrease in taxes sets off a large expansion in the economy characterized by persistent and hump shaped dynamics of the endogenous variables. Investment and consumer durables purchases display by far the largest elasticities to the cut in tax liabilities. Investment increases by around 1 percent point in the first quarter and continues to rise until 10 quarters after the change in tax liabilities where it peaks at 7.7 percent above trend. Consumer durables purchases respond much the same way and peaks at 7.3 percent above trend 9 quarters after the tax cut. Output increases more moderately and reaches a peak increase of 2.2 percent above trend 10 quarters after the tax cut. The impact on hours worked, instead, is estimated to be close to zero until around a year and a half after the change in taxes.
After that, hours worked increase gradually to a peak at 1.1 percent above trend 10 quarters after the tax shock.
Consumption of nondurables and services adjusts a bit faster to the tax cut and reaches a peak response of 1.1 percent 9 quarters after the tax cut.
Column (b) of Figure 1 shows the impact of an anticipated tax liability cut. The results provide evidence for anticipation effects: The announcement (by legislation) of a future tax liability reduction sets off a downturn in the economy that lasts until the tax cut is eventually implemented. Investment falls 4.5 percent below trend one year before the tax cut is implemented. The peak drop in investment is statistically significant. Output drops 1.1 percent four quarters before the tax liability cut is implemented. The decrease in output is statistically significant from zero during almost the entire pre-implementation period. Hours worked also drop significantly below trend throughout the announcement period down to 1.9 percent below trend 4 quarters before the tax cut. We find a 2.7 percent drop in consumer durables purchases 5 quarters before the tax cut is implemented, but the confidence interval is quite wide throughout the announcement period. Consumption of nondurables and services is instead approximately unaffected by the announcement of a future tax cut and is basically at trend when the tax cut is eventually implemented. Thus, the anticipation effects on the consumption variables are very different from the other variables. The absence of a strong news effect on consumption of nondurables and services are consistent with previous studies examining how anticipated tax changes affect consumption choices.
The actual implementation of the anticipated tax cut is associated with an expansion in the economy similar to the impact of an unanticipated tax cut. Apart from hours worked, the increase in activity occurs slightly faster than in response to unanticipated tax cuts. At forecast horizons beyond two years, anticipated and unanticipated changes in taxes have very similar effects. The maximum increase in output (a 1.7 rise above trend) occurs 9 quarters after the tax cut is implemented, while investment peaks at 7.5 percent above trend (also 9 quarters after the cut in the taxes). As in the case of unanticipated tax cuts, the consumption response reaches its new higher level relatively quickly. The response of hours worked is somewhat weaker than the other variables in the post-implementation period (and imprecisely estimated). The sizes of the implementation-to-peak responses of the endogenous variables in response to the anticipated tax cut are very similar to the peak impacts in response to unanticipated tax cuts. Thus, the main differences between the impact of an implemented anticipated and unanticipated tax cut is that the peak response occurs somewhat earlier in the latter case.
In deriving these results, we have assumed that pre-announced tax changes can have an impact on X t from a maximum of 6 quarters before their implementation. Panel (a) in Figure 2 illustrates the impact of an anticipated tax liability cut when we vary K, the maximum anticipation horizon, between 4 and 10 quarters. For values of K in this range, there is always an output decline prior to implementation and an output expansion after implementation of the tax cut. The depth of the pre-implementation downturn and the size of the post-implementation expansion are sensitive to K: the longer the anticipation horizon (amongst the values that we examine), the deeper is the pre-implementation downturn and the milder is the post-implementation expansion. In Section 4 we will examine whether these results are consistent with economic theory.
In the literature that has estimated the impact of fiscal shocks using vector autoregressions, c.f. Blanchard and Perotti (2002) , it has been argued that the impact of tax shocks are much smaller in the post-1980's sample than in the earlier parts of the sample. We have examined these issues and the results turn out to depend much upon the specification of the empirical model. Reestimating equation (1) directly for data starting in 1980:1 implies a much smaller impact of surprise tax shocks but not substantially smaller (or different) effects of anticipated tax shocks. However, this change in the estimates of the impact of surprise tax shocks may be due to the fact that the empirical model implies that a large amount of parameters are estimated with relatively few datapoints thus leading to few degrees of freedom and more pertinent small sample problems. 5 Moreover, it turns out that most of the larger and more informative surprise tax changes occur in the pre-1980 sample. An alternative check on the stability of the results is to exclude certain tax legislations from the sample. As discussed in Mertens and Ravn (2009) this exercise points towards stability of the results.
In this section we investigate whether a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model can account for the empirical results derived above. We extend earlier DSGE models of distortionary taxation, such as Baxter and King (1993) , Braun (1994) and McGrattan (1994) , by introducing features such as habit formation, adjustment costs, durables consumption, and variable capacity utilization. Burnside, Eichenbaum and Fisher (2004) 
.1 The Benchmark Model
Households There is a large number of identical, infinitely lived households. We will later allow for heterogeneous households to study the role of limited asset market participation. The representative household's preferences are given by:
E t is the mathematical expectations operator conditional on all information available at date t, 0 < β < 1 is a discount factor, σ > 0 is a curvature parameter, ω > 0 is a preference weight, 1/κ ≥ 0 is the Frisch elasticity of labor supply, and n t denotes hours worked. z t denotes the level of labor augmenting technology which we assume grows at a constant rate, z t /z t−1 = γ z . The term z 1−σ t that affects the disutility of work is introduced to allow for a balanced growth path. The variable x t is a habit-adjusted consumption basket defined as
where ϑ ∈ [0, 1] is a share parameter, µ ∈ [0, 1) is a habit persistence parameter, C t ≥ 0 denotes consumption of consumer nondurables and V t ≥ 0 denotes the stock of consumer durables.
The representative household maximizes (2) subject to the following set of constraints:
Equation (4) 
fore the depreciation rate of the capital stock along the balanced growth path. Equation (6) is the flow budget constraint in period t. The left hand side of this equation is household expenditure on both types of consumption goods and on physical capital. The right hand side is the income flow net of taxes. The term (1 − τ n,t ) w t n t denotes after-tax labor income, the product of hours worked and the real wage w t , net of labor income taxes. τ n,t
is the labor income tax rate.
(1 − τ k,t ) r t u k,t K t is after-tax income from renting capital stock. r t denotes the rental rate of capital services and τ k,t is the capital income tax rate. Λ t and T RA t denote depreciation allowances and lump-sum government transfers, respectively.
Following Auerbach (1989) , we specify depreciation allowances as
where δ τ denotes the rate of depreciation for tax purposes. Note that this specification allows the depreciation rate for tax purposes δ τ to differ from δ k .
The first-order conditions for the household's problem are given as:
where λ c,t is the multiplier on (6), λ c,t q k,t is the multiplier on (5) and λ c,t q v,t is the multiplier on (4). The variable Γ t that enters equation (12) is the expected present value of depreciation allowances on new investments. It is determined recursively as
Equation (8) sets λ c,t equal to the marginal utility of consumption of nondurables (which depends on both current and future consumption due to habit persistence). Equation (9) equates the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure with the after-tax real wage. Equation (10) equates the shadow value of new capital, q k,t , to the expected present value of the stream of future rental rates net of depreciation. Equation (11) determines the shadow value of new consumer durables, q v,t , as the expected present value of the utility stream generated by the durables stock net of depreciation. The first-order condition for investment in market capital in equation (12) implies that the change in investment is determined by the expected discounted present value of current and future levels of q k,t and Γ t . When the shadow value of new capital or the value of depreciation allowances rise above their steady state values, the growth rate in investment rises. Similarly, equation (13) determines the growth rate of consumer durables as a function of the expected present discounted value of the stream of shadow values of the consumer durables stock. Equation (14) defines implicitly the optimal utilization rate of market capital as a function of its current net return relative to the shadow value of the capital stock.
Firms There is a continuum of identical competitive firms with Cobb-Douglas production functions:
where Y t denotes output, ν > 0 is a constant, α ∈ (0, 1) is the elasticity of output to the effective input of capital services and z t denotes the level of labor augmenting technology. The factor demand functions are given by:
Government The government purchases goods G t from the private sector which it finances with capital and labor income taxes. The government runs a balanced budget,
where T t = τ n,t w t n t + τ k,t r t u k,t K t − Λ t is total income tax revenue (net of depreciation allowances). The process for government spending G t is
revealed at date t but implemented at date t + j. Here we will assume that j = b at the announcement date so that anticipated tax changes are announced with a fixed implementation lag of b periods. 6 The capital income and labor income tax rates evolve according to the stochastic processes:
where τ n , τ k ∈ [0, 1) are constants that determine the long run unconditional means of the two tax rates. We follow McGrattan (1994) and allow for an AR(2) structure of the tax processes with the restriction that |ρ n,1 + ρ n,2 | < 1
The innovations to the tax rates are assumed to be iid with zero mean, ε t ∼ iid (0, Ω ε ) and
The innovations to both types of tax rates are allowed to be correlated but we assume that ε t and ξ t are orthogonal.
Equilibrium Goods market clearing requires
A competitive equilibrium consists of allocations
that solve equations (4), (5), (8)- (14) and (16)- (23) subject to the usual boundary conditions.
Equilibrium Dynamics Variations in τ n,t and τ k,t affect the economy through wealth and substitution effects.
There are two sources of wealth effects. First, if π G = 0, shocks to distortionary tax rates affect government spending, change the present discounted value of the taxes required to finance the altered path of government spending and therefore affect household lifetime wealth. Second, changes in distortionary taxes alter households' expected lifetime utility through Harberger triangles, which in classical utility analysis translates into a wealth effect, see e.g. King (1989) . Higher wealth due to a cut in distortionary taxes is associated with an increase in consumption and a decline in labor supply. The decline in labor supply relative to the increase in consumption is determined by the ratio σ/κ. The higher the Frisch elasticity of labor supply, 1/κ, and the higher is σ, the larger 6 In the web appendix we also examine the more flexible case where anticipated taxes are announced with any anticipation lag between 1 and b periods.
is the decline in labor supply relative to the increase in consumption. Substitution effects occur due to changes in relative prices but these effects depend greatly on how taxes are changed and on the model parameters.
Consider an unanticipated cut in the labor income tax rate. The wealth effect calls for an increase in consumption and a decline in labor supply. The decline in tax rates also raises after-tax wages which stimulates labor supply and consumption. Moreover, changes in the path of after tax wages and in the return on capital affect labor supply through intertemporal substitution. To see this, combine equations (9) and (10):
where
is the expected net return on market capital. A cut in labor income taxes may increase or decrease current labor supply relative future labor supply depending on its impact on after-tax wages.
) w t+1 , current labor supply will rise relative to future labor supply and vice versa. 7 Therefore, the response of labor supply depends on the wealth effect relative to the substitution effects, and the latter depends on the tax process.
The labor supply response interacts with the response of investment in market capital. A log-linearization of the first-order conditions implies that:
where i t = ln ((I t /z t )/(I/z)) denotes the percentage deviation of detrended investment from its steady state value and q k,t and Γ t are defined analogously. When labor supply rises in response to a cut in labor income taxes, the shadow value of capital increases (see equation (10)) which stimulates current investment.
The announcement of a future cut in labor income taxes has effects distinct from the implementation of a cut in labor income taxes. Due to the rise in wealth and the expected future increase in after-tax real wages, labor supply may drop during the pre-implementation period. If this occurs, the drop in hours worked lowers the return on capital goods which depresses investment (see equation (25)) unless adjustment costs are very high. Thus, output will tend to decrease in the anticipation of a future cut in labor income taxes. These predictions all appear 7 Due to the AR(2) structure of the tax processes, an innovation to taxes may initially lead to an increasing or a decreasing tax profile.
consistent with the empirical evidence presented in Section 2 . More intriguing is the impact on consumption of nondurables. The wealth effect will tend to increase consumption during the pre-implementation period. This increase in consumption will occur in a smooth manner if the habit parameter, µ, is sufficiently large. Moreover, the drop in current output increases the intertemporal price of output which has a negative impact on households' purchases of durable consumption goods and, since the two consumption goods are complementary, this further moderates the increase in the consumption of nondurables. Thus, our model does not automatically predict a strong consumption response to anticipated future tax changes.
The first-order effect of a surprise cut in capital income taxes is an increase in the return on market capital, which boosts investment. The impact on labor supply is ambiguous since the wealth effect and the intertemporal substitution effects are oppositely signed. The rise in the real interest rate implies that the hours worked profile must be decreasing, which moderates the positive wealth effect on consumption, see Braun (1994) . Thus, depending on parameters, labor supply and consumption may increase or decrease in response to a cut in capital income taxes. As discussed by Auerbach (1989) , adjustment costs are key for understanding the impact of the announcement of a future cut in capital income tax rates. When adjustment costs are small, investment will tend to fall abruptly when a future capital income tax rate cut is announced until the period immediately before the tax rate cut is implemented. This is because lower expected future capital income tax rates make current investment unattractive. When adjustment costs are high, it may instead be optimal to increase investment immediately in order to increase the capital stock gradually so that the high returns on capital income can be harvested when the tax rate is eventually adjusted.
In summary, the response of the model to changes in tax rates depends crucially on parameters that determine wealth and substitution effects, on the importance of consumer durables and habit persistence, and on adjustment costs. In the next section, we estimate the structural parameters that are most important in determining these features.
Model Estimation
We partition the set of parameters into two subsets:
where Θ 1 is a vector of calibrated parameters and Θ 2 is a vector of parameters to be estimated. Θ 1 contains those parameters for which there are good grounds for selecting values by calibration. A model period corresponds to one quarter. βγ −σ z , the effective subjective discount factor, is calibrated to match a 3 percent annual real interest rate. ω, the preference weight on the disutility of work, is calibrated so that hours worked is on average equal to 25 percent of the time endowment. We set the share parameter ϑ such that durables consumption expenditure accounts for 11.9 percent of total consumption expenditure, which matches the corresponding number in the US during for the post WWII sample. Steady state output (divided by the level of labor augmenting technology) is normalized to 1. We calibrate the constant ν in equation (16) to match this normalization. The rate of labor augmenting technological progress, γ z , is assumed to be equal to 1.005 which implies an average annual output growth rate of approximately 2 percent, the average growth rate of real per capita US GDP in the post war period. We assume that δ v = δ k = 0.025 so that the steady state annual depreciation rates are equal to approximately 10 percent. We set α equal to 36 percent, which produces income shares close to those observed in the US, and set Ψ k (1) to normalize the steady state value of capacity utilization to unity.
In the benchmark estimation we assume that π G = 0 such that government spending is not affected by changes in income taxes. We later relax this assumption. The steady state level of government spending is set to 20.1 percent of GDP, matching the post WWII government spending share in the US. The announcement horizon b is equal to 6 quarters. We set the steady state tax rates, τ n and τ k , equal to 26 percent and 42 percent, respectively, which are the average effective US tax rates for labor and capital income found by Mendoza, Razin and Tesar (1994) .
Following Auerbach (1989) we set the depreciation rate for tax purposes, δ τ , equal to twice the economic rate of depreciation along the balanced growth path. Finally, we assume that tax liability shocks give rise to changes in both the capital income tax rate and in the labor income tax rate and that the two tax innovations are of equal size. Our motivation for this assumption is that most of the tax liability changes in practice affect the taxation of both types of income. Table 2 summarizes the calibration of Θ 1 .
For the benchmark model, the vector of parameters to be estimated is
. We estimate Θ 2 by matching the empirical impulse responses from Section 2 to impulse responses generated by the theoretical model. The latter are obtained from a VAR identical to (1) estimated in model generated artificial samples. We use a simulation approach rather than theoretical impulse response matching because the empirical VAR imposes constraints that do not generally hold in the model. In Appendix A, we show that the vector of observables in the theoretical model has a time series
. This representation involves moving average terms in the tax shocks, which are assumed to be observable when estimating the empirical VAR. Under conditions laid out in appendix A, this representation is general for linearized DSGE models.
The main difference between the representation of the observables in equation (26) and the empirical model
in (1) is that the latter restricts the order of moving average polynomials of implemented tax changes to be finite rather than infinite. The lag polynomialsD (L) andF (L) depend on a dampening matrix Γ WW (see the appendix for details) with roots that are determined by the persistence of the tax processes. When the tax processes are very persistent, distant innovations to the tax rates may potentially have important impact on the current value of the observables and in that case, the need to constrain the order of the moving average terms could be too restrictive. 8 Because of this, in addition to standard issues related to small sample uncertainty, the empirical VAR based estimates of the response to tax shocks are approximations to the data generating process implied by the theoretical model.
We confront this problem by applying a simulation estimator. 9 We estimate Θ 2 as the vector of variables that solves the following minimization problem:
where Λ d T denotes the vectorized empirical responses, Λ m T (Θ 2 |Θ 1 ) are the equivalent estimates from the theoretical model and Σ
−1
d is a weighting matrix. As in the empirical section, we set the implementation lag equal to 6 quarters for the anticipated shocks. We set the weighting matrix to be a diagonal matrix with the estimates of the inverse of the sampling variance of the impulse responses along its diagonal. For the benchmark case, the vector Λ d T contains 280 moments which are used to estimate the 10 structural model parameters contained in Θ 2 . Unless 8 There is another subtle difference which has to do with the possible truncation of the anticipation horizon. In the empirical VAR we truncate anticipated tax shocks at K = 6 quarters due to the lack of a sufficient number of observations of tax changes with longer anticipation lags. In the model economy, agents may receive news with longer anticipation horizons unless we assume that b = K. Our benchmark estimates will impose this condition. In the web-appendix we relax this assumption. 2. Add a small amount of measurement error to X j (Θ 2 |Θ 1 ). Let X j (Θ 2 |Θ 1 ) denote the resulting artificial samples of X.
3. For each artificial dataset, estimate the following model: Several features of the above procedure merit further discussion. First, the VAR applied to the simulated data in (28) to obtain Λ m T (Θ 2 |Θ 1 ) is identical to the VAR in (1) used to compute Λ d T . Second, in the benchmark case we abstract from any non-tax shocks. To avoid stochastic singularity, we instead add a small white noise measurement error in the second step algorithm. To maintain focus on the transmission of tax shocks, we prefer to avoid parametrizing other shock processes. 10 As part of robustness analysis, we have repeated the estimation for a model with technology, labor supply and government spending shocks (the results are available in the companion web appendix to the paper). Finally, the representation in (26) expresses X t as a function of the structural shocks to marginal tax rates. In the Romer and Romer (2008a) data as well as in (28), the tax shocks are instead measured in terms of changes in total tax revenues projected at the date of legislation as a percentage of GDP at the time of implementation. For consistency, the size of the innovations to the tax rates are computed such that they induce a ceteris paribus one percent change in tax revenues relative to GDP for the implementation date. In
the robustness analysis, we analyze sensitivity to the source of the tax liability change by looking at the polar cases of either only labor tax or only capital income tax rate shocks.
Following Hall, Inoue, Nason and Rossi (2009), we compute the standard errors of the vector Θ 2 from an estimate of its asymptotic covariance matrix as
Σ denotes the full covariance matrix of the impulse responses estimated in Section 2 (Σ d contains the diagonal elements of Σ), and Σ j is the covariance matrix of the j'th replication of the model based impulse responses. Table 3 reports the parameter estimates of the benchmark model as well as estimates of the parameters pertaining to a number of robustness analyses. We will here first discuss the benchmark results. The last column of this table gives the value of the quadratic loss function in equation (27) The estimates of the adjustment cost parameters indicate that investment adjustment costs are relevant for both capital stocks but matter slightly more for the market capital stock than for consumer durables. Our point estimate of φ k is 8.488, while the point estimate of φ v is 7.795. We find some role for fluctuations in the utilization rate of the market capital stock. The point estimate of ψ k is 0.619 which implies that changes in the utilization rate have a moderate impact on the gross depreciation rate of the capital stock. 12 The estimates for the autoregressive parameters pertaining to the tax processes, ρ n,1 = 1.483, ρ n,2 = −0.484, ρ k,1 = 1.707 and ρ k,2 = −0.729, indicate high persistence of the tax processes and that tax rates rise for a few periods before returning to their initial level following a tax rate innovation. The estimates also imply that the largest root of Γ WW , the dampening matrix discussed above, is very close to one. Therefore, it might potentially be important to take into account that the empirical model imposes a finite moving average structure on the implemented tax shocks. Figure 3 illustrates the dynamics of the two tax rates following a one percent decrease in tax liabilities. We also show the dynamics of total tax liabilities relative to GDP. In the case of an unanticipated tax liability cut, the resulting initial change in the two tax rates corresponds to a 1.4 percentage points drop in the two distortionary tax rates. The labor income tax rate continues to fall for another year and a half eventually falling by around 2.6 percentage point after at which it remain low for a very long period. The capital income tax rate displays a more volatile pattern reaching a maximum decline of 4 percentage points 5 quarters after the tax cut, but then returns relatively quickly to its steady state level. In the case of an anticipated tax cut, tax liabilities drop slightly during the pre-implementation period, but the implied initial change in tax rates at the implementation date is practically identical to the case of an unanticipated tax cut. The high persistence of the labor income tax rate appears consistent with substantial amounts of tax smoothing. Figure 4 illustrates the impact of a one percent tax liability cut in the model economy given the parameter estimates just discussed. The left column of Figure 4 shows the response to a one percent surprise tax liability cut (relative to GDP), while the right column shows the impact of a one percent anticipated tax liability cut.
Benchmark Results
The model is quite successful in accounting for the main features of the empirical estimates. In particular, as in the US data:
• an unanticipated tax liability cut gives rise to a major expansion in output, consumption, investment and hours worked;
• the announcement of a future tax liability cut gives rise to a drop in output, investment and hours worked during the pre-implementation period; and
• the implementation of a pre-announced tax liability cut is associated with expansions of output, consumption, investment and hours worked.
Moreover, the sizes and the shapes of the impulse responses of the model are very similar to their empirical counterparts. In no case do the theoretical responses fall outside the confidence intervals of the empirical estimates for more than a few quarters. 13 Particularly interesting is the fact that the model is consistent with the delayed increase in hours worked in response to an unanticipated tax cut and in response to the implementation of an anticipated tax cut. Below we discuss why this is the case.
The model is also successful in accounting for the dynamics of investment. Due to adjustment costs, cuts in taxes lead to a steady decline in investment during the pre-implementation period in response to a pre-announced tax cut that almost perfectly emulates the pattern observed in the US data. On the other hand, the model underestimates the peak response of investment to implemented tax cuts. Nevertheless, the theoretical responses are within the confidence interval of the empirical estimates.
Recall that consumption of nondurables and services basically does not respond to announcements of future tax changes. The model presented in Section 3 implies a steady, but small, increase in consumption of nondurables and services to an anticipated tax cut during the pre-implementation period. The rise in consumption is sufficiently small that it is inside the confidence interval of the empirical estimates during much of the preimplementation period. This result appears counterintuitive. For that reason, we examine this aspect of our results in some detail in Section 6 below.
Comparing the two measures of the theoretical impulse responses shows that they are very similar for the forecast horizons that we consider (but not at very long forecast horizons). Therefore, although the roots of the tax processes are very persistent, the approximation error due to the finite MA specification of the empirical model appears to be of limited concern for the short to medium term impact of tax liability changes.
In the US data, the size of the pre-implementation contraction in output in response to an anticipated tax cut is smaller the shorter the assumed implementation lag (see Figure 2) . We now examine whether the DSGE model is consistent with this finding by computing the impulse response of output varying the parameter b in equations 
.1 Accounting For the Consumption Response
Perhaps somewhat surprising is that the theoretical model, while leaving room for improvement, is not completely at odds with the data in accounting for the lack of a strong response of nondurables consumption to the announcement of future tax changes. Moreover, we have found a rather sluggish response of hours worked to tax changes despite the Frisch labor supply elasticity being quite large. To shed some light on the sources of these results and we conduct a Hicksian decomposition of the responses of consumption and hours following a one percent tax liability cut into wealth and substitution effects (see King (1989) ).
Let the initial steady state allocation be denoted by (C, V , n) with associated after-tax factor prices ((1 − τ n )w,
(1 − τ k )r) and denote by U SS 0 the discounted lifetime utility associated with this allocation. Let the path of the economy following a one percent tax liability cut be given by the allocation (C t ,V t , n t ) ∞ t=0 with associated factor
and define U 1 as the present discounted utility associated with this path.
The wealth effect is then computed as the constant levels of consumption (of nondurables and of durables)
and hours worked such that, at the initial steady state prices, U C 1 ,V 1 , n 1 = U 1 . We decompose the substitution effect into a real wage effect, a rental rate effect, and a wedge which we compute residually. The latter arises because of the costs of adjusting the durables stock and the stock of capital. 15 The wage and rental rate effects are computed as the optimal paths of consumption and hours worked when households are faced with the price sequences
, respectively, under the constraint that present discounted utility associated with these allocations is equal to U SS 0 . Figure 5 illustrates the paths of after-tax real wages and real rental rates together with the decompositions of the responses consumption of nondurables and hours worked after a one percent cut in tax liabilities. After an unanticipated tax cut, after-tax real wages and real rental rates both rise following bell shaped patterns. The maximum increase in after-tax real wages occurs 6 quarters after the tax cut while the maximum increase in the after-tax rental rate takes place 7 quarters after the tax cut.
Since we assume that π G = 0, the wealth effects derive from Harberger triangles since lower factor income taxes temporarily reduce the inefficiency induced by distortionary taxes. Since both leisure and consumption are normal goods, a tax cut implies a positive wealth effect on consumption and a drop in hours worked. Quantitatively, the wealth effects are small for both hours worked and nondurables consumption. Moreover, since the 15 In the absence of adjustment costs, the laws of motion for the capital stock and for the consumer durables stock can be substituted into the household's budget constraint. Iterating this constraint forward (and imposing transversality conditions) gives rise to a single life-time budget constraint for expenditure on the two consumption goods which depends only on initial wealth, on the stream of transfers and depreciation allowances and on the two relative prices. When there are adjustment costs, the two laws of motion cannot be eliminated since adjustment costs introduce a wedge between the (after-tax) real interest rate and the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution. wealth effect is constant along the adjustment path, the dynamics derive entirely from substitution effects.
The substitution effects are more intricate. The rising profile of the after-tax real wage profile implies a gradual rise in hours worked. This effect is countered by the impact of the profile of the after-tax real rental rate which implies a gradual fall in hours worked in the immediate aftermath of the tax cut. These two effects together lead to the slow rise in hours worked implied by the model.
The rise in after tax real wages gives rise to an increasing time profile of nondurables consumption. The humpshaped pattern of the wage trajectory, however, implies that consumption grows very gradually over time. Moreover, the persistent rise in after-tax real interest rates lowers current consumption relative to future consumption implying a bell-shaped increase in nondurables consumption. Finally, the presence of adjustment costs implies some initial substitution towards consumption as the implied growth in investment lowers the relative consumption price. Thus, the combination of the wage and rental rate effects and the wedge implied by adjustment costs account for the solid growth in consumption that follows the tax cut.
An anticipated tax cut lowers (increases) the after-tax rental rate (real wage) very marginally during the preimplementation period while the paths of these prices after implementation of the tax cut are very similar to the paths that follow an unanticipated tax cut. As above, we find that the wealth effects are small quantitatively.
The expectation of higher future after-tax wages depresses hours worked during the pre-implementation period but once the tax cut is implemented, the wage effect is associated with a rise in hours worked. The drop in hours worked during the pre-implementation period associated with the wage effect also reduces spending on consumer durables (and on investment goods) which, due to complementarity between the two consumption goods, implies a negative wage impact on consumption of nondurables.
The rental rate effect implies that the consumption profile must be increasing once taxes are eventually cut. Due to habit persistence, the rental rate effect leads to an increase in consumption already during the pre-implementation period. Thus, the wage and rental rate effects together imply a moderately increasing consumption profile during the pre-implementation period and a more pronounced increase in consumption once taxes are eventually cut.
The rental rate effect on labor supply implies that the labor supply profile must be negatively sloped during the pre-implementation period and for a period once taxes are eventually cut. Hence, the wage and rental rate effects give rise to a prolonged drop in hours worked in response to the announcement of future lower taxes that is only reversed once the positive wage effect eventually starts dominating the negative rental rate effect.
In summary, we find that the adjustment paths of consumption and labor supply are dominated by substitution effects. Equilibrium wealth effects are relative minor and, since they are constant, do not help understanding the intertermporal adjustments.
Extensions and Robustness Analysis
In this section we examine the robustness of our results. We look at three different issues. First we examine the extent to which the results -especially those relating to the impact of tax changes on consumption -are sensitive to our preference specification which allows for two sources of intertemporal non-separabilities. Secondly, we look at the sensitivity to the modeling of the processes of taxes and of government spending. Finally, we extend the model to allow for rule-of-thumb consumers in order to evaluate the potential importance of liquidity constraints.
.1 Habit Formation and Consumer Durables
The model that we have examined incorporates two sources of intertemporal non-separabilities, habit formation and consumer durables. Habit formation has received quite a lot of attention in the business cycle literature and is generally accepted as being important for accounting for the impact of monetary policy shocks, see e.g. Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005) . The role of consumer durables has received somewhat less attention in this part of the literature. In this section, we examine in more detail how both these features matter for understanding the impact of tax changes.
The second row of Table 3 reports the parameter estimates of Θ 2 when we exclude consumer durables from the model. 16 Eliminating consumer durables leads to a large increase in the estimate of the Frisch labor supply elasticity and leads to an estimate of the parameters of the labor tax process which imply a sudden and very persistent change in labor income taxes following a tax innovation. There are also some changes in the parameters relating to habit formation and capital adjustment costs both of which fall marginally. The value of the minimized quadratic form indicates that this version of the model fits the estimated impulse responses significantly worse than the benchmark model thus indicating that consumer durables are an important factor for understanding how tax changes affect the economy.
The reason for this can be understood more clearly from Figure 6 , which shows the impact of a 1 percent tax liability cut using the parameter estimates from this version of the model. As is clear, although the model is still successful in accounting for the output response to the tax shock, this version of the model has more difficulty accounting for the adjustments of nondurables consumption and hours worked. In particular, the elasticity of nondurables consumption to the tax cut implied by the model is now significantly smaller than the empirical estimates for both unanticipated and anticipated tax liability changes. This indicates that the complementarity between durables and nondurables consumption is an important aspect of the model. Moreover, despite the higher Frisch labor supply elasticity, this version of the model implies a less elastic response of hours worked to anticipated tax changes due to complementarity between the consumption of leisure and of consumption goods.
The third row of Table 3 reports the parameter estimates when we restrict the habit parameter to be equal to zero, µ = 0. When habit formation is excluded, the point estimate of σ increases from 3.76 to 7.18, which is above values usually considered reasonable. We also find a substantial increase in the estimate of investment adjustment costs. Moreover, the fit of the model deteriorates substantially as indicated by the value of the minimized quadratic form which increases by more than 40 percent when we set µ = 0. Figure 7 shows that the elimination of habits has rather serious consequences for the extent to which the model can account for the impact of tax changes on nondurables consumption. Perhaps surprisingly, the main problem is not that consumption jumps to a new higher level when there are anticipated future tax cuts -in fact when there are no habits the model is consistent with a flat response of nondurables consumption throughout the pre-implementation period -but rather that consumption jumps upon implementation of tax cuts. This feature of the model with no habits is at odds with the empirical estimates of the consumption response and this also explains why we find a much higher value σ when habits are eliminated; For low values of this parameter, consumption adjusts even faster to tax changes.
Thus, time-non-separabilities in the utility function seem important for understanding the adjustment of the main macroeconomic aggregates to tax changes. Without such features it is hard to explain the gradual response of consumption to tax changes and the size of consumption and hours worked adjustments following tax shocks.
The benchmark model assumes that government consumption grows at a constant rate and is unaffected by changes in distortionary taxes. We now relax this assumption and allow for changes in distortionary taxes to affect government consumption. An important consequence of this extension is that it introduces additional wealth effects after a change in tax rates, which could be important for the initial impact of tax changes.
We reestimate the model allowing π G to differ from zero. Since tax liabilities fall after the decrease in tax rates (see Figure 3) , a positive value of π G indicates a stronger positive wealth effect while a negative value of π G instead lowers the wealth effect. The fourth row of Table 3 reports the parameter estimates for this alternative scenario. The point estimate of π G is 0.221, which implies that the wealth effects are stronger in this model than in the benchmark model. Introducing this feature also has some impact on other parameter estimates most notably on those relating to preferences. In particular, allowing for an endogenous response of government spending gives rise to more moderate estimates of the utility curvature σ, a somewhat higher estimate of the Frisch labor supply elasticity as well as an even more persistent habit effect than in the benchmark model. With this new feature, the model also appears to fit the data considerably better than the benchmark model. All in all, the elasticity of government spending to tax changes is nonetheless relatively small, which squares well with Romer and Romer (2008b) who find little impact of tax changes on government spending. According to their results, if anything, tax cuts appear to increase government spending. The implied responses to the tax shocks, shown in Figure 8 , are very similar to the benchmark model, although the fit of the hours response is somewhat better than in the benchmark model.
.3 Capital Income Taxes vs. Labor Income Taxes
In the benchmark model, a change in tax liabilities is assumed to result from simultaneous changes in labor income taxes and capital income taxes (including depreciation allowances). It is natural to verify the sensitivity of our results to alternatively assuming that tax liability changes are due only one of these two tax rates. To examine this, Table 3 contains the parameter estimates when we allow for changes in the labor income tax rate only (row 5), or in the capital income tax rate only (row 6). Figures 9 and 10 illustrate the resulting impulse response functions.
According to the minimized value of the quadratic form, the ability of the model to account for the response of the observables to changes in tax liabilities falls significantly when we allow for variations in only one of the two tax rates. Moreover, the estimates of the structural parameters are sensitive to these alternative models of taxes. When we allow only for changes in labor income tax rates, the adjustment cost parameter estimates fall dramatically as does the impact of variations in capital utilization on the depreciation rate (therefore implying large variations in the utilization rate). Alternatively, when we allow for changes only in the capital income tax rate, the Frisch labor supply elasticity goes to infinity and the estimate of σ falls to 0.41. Thus, the parameter estimates indicate somewhat high sensitivity to the modeling of taxes and the values minimized quadratic form show that allowing for variations in both capital and labor income tax rates produce a much better fit than any of the alternative models.
Nonetheless, the impulse response functions show that allowing for variations in only one of the two tax rates still allows the model to fit the estimated impact of tax changes quite well qualitatively. In particular, both alternative versions of the model are able to account for the expansionary impact of an implemented tax cut and for the negative impacts on output, hours and investment of the announcement of a future tax cut. Quantitatively, when we allow for changes in labor income tax rates only, the model underestimates the impact of tax cuts on investment and overestimates the speed of adjustment of hours worked. Hence, we conclude that allowing for variations in both labor income and capital income tax rates is very important for the quantitatively, but not necessarily for the finding that tax cuts are expansionary when implemented and recessionary during the pre-implementation period.
.4 Rule-Of-Thumb Behavior
The absence of a strong aggregate consumption response to tax news is consistent with previous microeconometric evidence on the impact of pre-announced tax changes on household consumption referenced in the introduction. Mankiw (2000) argues on the basis of this evidence for introducing rule-of-thumb consumers as a standard feature of macroeconomic models and estimates the share of these consumers to be close to 50 percent.
Galí, López-Salido and Vallés (2007) show that the presence of rule-of-thumb consumers may be important for accounting for evidence on the impact of government spending shocks. It seems natural to extend our benchmark model with rule-of-thumb consumption behavior and verify its role in accounting for the aggregate responses to tax changes. As in Campbell and Mankiw (2004) and Galí, López-Salido and Vallés (2007), we assume that rule-of-thumb consumers can neither borrow nor save and simply consume their income period-by-period. For simplicity, we assume that rule-of-thumb households have intertemporally separable preferences and that they do not value durable goods. This latter assumption makes the model more similar to previous contributions since it implies that rule-of-thumb households have no way of smoothing utility intertemporally but through labor supply.
There is a continuum of households. A fraction ς are households identical to those in Section 3 . A fraction 1 − ς are rule-of-thumb households with preferences
where C * t denotes consumption of nondurables of rule-of-thumb consumers and n * t is their labor supply. These households face the budget constraint
where and T RA * t are government transfers to the rule-of-thumb households.
Galí, López-Salido and Vallés (2007) argue that rule-of-thumb behavior alone does not suffice to account for the positive consumption response to government spending shocks usually found in fiscal VARs, but must be combined with imperfectly competitive labor markets. Following Galí, López-Salido and Vallés (2007), we assume that wages are set by labor unions. Suppose there is a continuum of unions, each representing workers of a certain type indexed by j. Suppose that both consumer types are uniformly distributed across worker types and n t ( j) denotes the labor supply of household of type j. The typical union sets the wage of its members to maximize (see Galí, López-Salido and Vallés (2007) for details):
subject to demand by firms for labor of type j given by
where λ and N t is aggregate labor demand. Firms allocate labor demand uniformly across different workers of type j, independently of their household type. Assuming symmetry, in equilibrium
In the system of equilibrium conditions of the model with rule-of-thumb households, this labor supply equation
replaces the old one in (9) while the following equations are added
where we have assumed that both types of households receive the same transfers, T RA t = T RA * t . Finally, the aggregate resource constraint, production function and government budget constraint are now
We set ω * such that the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and hours worked equalize across the two types of agents along the balanced growth path. We choose ωρ/(ρ − 1) such that the average hours worked is 25 percent of the time endowment on average. As a result, the extended model has only one additional parameter relative to the benchmark model, the fraction of rule-of-thumb households 1 − ς.
The last row of Table 3 , reports the estimates of the augmented model. According to these estimates, the share of rule-of-thumb consumers (1 − ς) is around 15.2 percent, which translates into a 14.6% average share in total consumption or a 16.6% average share in total nondurable consumption. This is considerably smaller than the values used in most of the literature. Moreover, the standard error of the point estimate of ς is relatively small.
The remaining parameter estimates are quite similar to those of the benchmark model with the exception of the Frisch labor supply elasticity which increases from just above 1 to approximately 3.5. We note from the value of the quadratic form that this model appears to fit the data substantially better than the benchmark model and any of the other alternative variations that we have considered. share of rule-of-thumb agents is relatively low compared to other studies is explained by two features of the response to tax shocks. First, too large a share of rule-of-thumb consumers makes it harder to account for the elastic response of investment to tax changes. Note that even the benchmark model implies a somewhat smaller peak response of investment to tax changes than our empirical estimates. This is because adjustment costs are needed to explain the response of investment to pre-announced tax changes but, at the same time, also imply a less elastic investment response to implemented tax changes. When we introduce rule-of-thumb consumers, this problem becomes even worse since investment is undertaken by the optimizing households only. Second, a large share of rule-of-thumb consumers makes it more difficult to account for the hours response to pre-announced tax changes. When the share of rule-of-thumb consumers is large it is hard to explain the drop in hours during the pre-announcement period, regardless of whether the labor market is competitive or not. We conclude that introducing rule-of-thumb consumers leads to a better fit of the model, but only when the share of these agents is relatively small.
Conclusions and Directions For Future Research
Estimates based on a reduced form model indicate that implemented tax cuts result in a major expansion in aggregate output, consumption, investment and hours worked. On the other hand, announcements of future tax cuts give rise to drops in output, investment and hours worked until the tax cut is eventually implemented, but consumption shows little change prior to implementation. We argue that a relatively standard DSGE model, with adjustment costs, consumer durables, variable capacity utilization, and consumption habits, can account relatively well for these empirical findings. Substitution effects are key for understanding the dynamic adjustment of the economy to changes in tax while wealth effects are less important. Introducing rule-of-thumb consumption behavior helps accounting for the weak consumption response to an announced tax cut. At the same time, the implied share of these agents must be substantially lower than what is most often assumed in the literature to explain the effects of anticipated tax changes.
There are in our view several promising avenues for future research. First, it would be interesting to examine more disaggregated tax measures in order to derive finer estimates of the impact of changes in particular taxes. Second, it is interesting to investigate whether similar results hold true for other countries than the US.
Third, our analysis has made some substantial simplifying assumptions about fiscal rules that could be relaxed in future work, in particular regarding how government spending policies and debt stabilization requirements affect tax dynamics. This is obviously highly relevant over the coming years as major fiscal adjustments will be required following the current economic downturn.
Finally, we emphasize that our analysis depends importantly on the assumption that the Romer and Romer (2008a) narrative tax changes are exogenous. While we have defended this assumption, much future work is needed, based on alternative reduced form models and identification schemes as well as alternative DSGE models and structural empirical approaches, to further improve our understanding of the macroeconomic effects of tax changes. A Deriving Equation (26) We solve the model by log-linearizing the first-order conditions around the deterministic steady state. Due to growth in technology, we first transform the growing variables into variables that are stationary along the balanced growth path. We implement a standard procedure to solve the resulting set of linear stochastic difference equations. The solution of the model can be represented by the following state space model:
where Z t+1 is the vector of endogenous states, W t is the vector of exogenous states, η t is the vector of innovations, and U t is the vector of controls. LetX t denote a vector of observable and appropriately detrended endogenous variablesX t with dynamics described byX
The vectorX t is generally a subset (or combination) of the set of variables contained in U t and Z t+1 . It follows from equation (A-1) that
provided Γ ZZ has all eigenvalues less then one in modulus. Combining (A-4) and (A-5) yields -6) and (b) on the assumptions that Γ ZZ and Γ WW have no eigenvalues greater than or equal to one in modulus. This latter set of assumptions amounts to the requirement that all model variables are (trend) stationary processes.
More special is the additional assumption that dim(X) = dim(Z) and Γ XZ is invertible, which requires the number of observables included in X t to be equal to the number of endogenous state variables. In our application, this condition is fulfilled and invertibility of Γ XZ is easily verified in practice. 
(1 Anticipated tax shocks are announced at date -6 and implemented at date 0.
